The Role of Socially Concerned Consumers in the Coexistence of Ethical and Standard Firms by Fanelli, Domenico
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Role of Socially Concerned
Consumers in the Coexistence of Ethical
and Standard Firms
Domenico Fanelli
18. January 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20117/
MPRA Paper No. 20117, posted 18. January 2010 16:51 UTC
The Role of Socially Concerned Consumers in the
Coexistence of Ethical and Standard Firms∗
Domenico Fanelli†
Preliminary version
January 18, 2010
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how socially concerned consumers’ preferences
affects firms’ decisions to commit to social responsibility. In a market in which firms face
the same demand function and products are homogeneous, we find that a large group of
socially concerned consumers or a low cost of social responsibility induces an equilibrium
outcome in which ethical and standard firms coexists in the same market. Our result
is relevant because we do not assume a product differentiation setup and firms do not
separate the market through labeling schemes.
JEL classification: C73; D43; M14; L15;
Keywords: CSR; Price Competition; Duopoly, ESS, Replicator Dynamics.
∗I would like to thank Antonella Ianni for helpful comments. Usual disclaimers apply.
I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Department of Economics of the Uni-
versity of Pisa. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the XIV Spring Meeting
of Young Economists on 23-25 April 2009 at the Marmara University, Istanbul (Turkey)
and at the Workshop in Industrial Organization: Theory, Empirics and Experiments on
19 and 20 June 2009 at the University of Salento, Lecce (Italy). The comments and
suggestions of participants at these meetings are much appreciated.
†Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Cannaregio, 873 S.
Giobbe - Venice, Italy. E-mail address: domenico.fanelli@unive.it.
1 Introduction 1
1 Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as “[a] concept whereby
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business op-
erations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”
(see Green Paper, 2001). One of the most famous example of CSR is Fair-
trade. Fairtrade is an alternative approach to conventional trade: producers
in over fifty countries respects several standards set by FLO International
(Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International) such as guaranteeing de-
cent wages to workers, ensuring health and safety standards and providing
adequate housing where relevant. In some markets, firms who commit to
CSR, hereafter ethical firms coexists with firms which do not integrate any
social concern in their business operations, hereafter standard firms and eth-
ical1 products are likely to cost a similar price to other products of the same
quality (see http://www.fairtrade.net/faqs.html?&no_cache=1$).
On the consumers’ side, many surveys and opinion polls show a pre-
disposition of consumers to CSR activities of firms (see MORI, 2000; The
Co-operative Bank, 2007). For instance, in MORI (2000), the first study de-
voted to social responsibility conducted across twelve European countries,
“70% of European consumers say that a company’s commitment to social re-
sponsibility is important when buying a product or service”. However there
appears to be a divergence between these surveys and the volume of sales of
ethical products, the CSR market is still a small proportion of the total an-
nual household consumer spending (see for instance The Co-operative Bank,
2007; Tallontire et al., 2001). Indeed not all the consumers who declare to
be socially concerned purchase ethical products. Thus, what we can deduce
from these surveys is that a group of consumers is socially concerned in the
sense that it desires to have a market in which ethical firms operate.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the presence of this group
of consumers affects firms decision to commit to CSR. In a market in which
firms face the same demand function and products are homogeneous, we
find that a large group of socially concerned consumers or a low cost of
1We use the term “ethical” in a broad sense to cover specific issues such as labor and
environmental standards, fairtrade and the like.
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CSR induces an equilibrium outcome in which ethical and standard firms
coexists in the same market. One assumption is crucial for our findings:
utility of socially concerned consumers is higher when ethical firms operate
in the market than the case in which market is entirely composed of standard
firms.
Research into CSR can be traced back to an important question in the
political and economic debate: do firms have any kind of social responsibility
beyond employment, production of goods and services and the maximization
of profits (Friedman, 1970)? This kind of responsibility in firms’ decisions
has been underestimated by mainstream theory. However, the dichotomy
between theoretical conclusions and actual firms’ behavior appears puzzling.
As a result, not surprisingly, CSR research has mainly focused on why some
firms choose to internalize social costs beyond legal constraints.2 To answer
this question, some scholars introduce the concept of CSR in an oligopoly
framework with product differentiation. The fact that consumers are con-
cerned about social traits of products is the foundation of the existence of
firms that commit to CSR. Contributions in this strand of literature have
been made, amongst others, by Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995); Amacher
et al. (2004); Alves and Santos-Pinto (2008); Becchetti and Solferino (2003);
Conrad (2005); Davies (2005); Mitrokostas and Petrakis (2008). In this lit-
erature, firms can decide their commitments to CSR and then compete on
prices or quantities. Consumers are socially concerned in the sense that
they are willing to pay a price premium for buying goods labeled as ethical.
Through ethical labeling firms are able to separate the market and obtain
different demand functions; in a duopoly setting, ethical firm serves the most
socially concerned consumers while its rival the less ones, each firm obtain-
ing positive market demands and profits. These contributions are similar to
traditional product differentiation models where firms offer different quali-
ties of products at different segments of the market (see, for instance, Motta,
1993; Tirole J., 1988). Our model differs from this literature since incentives
of firms to commit to CSR are obtained in a homogeneous product setup
where firms face the same demand function and a share of consumers desires
to have a market in which ethical firms operate.
2A critical survey on this debate is Kitzmueller (2008).
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We analyze a two-stage duopoly game. At the first stage, firms decide
their commitments to CSR while, at the second stage, they compete on
quantities (a la` Cournot). Products are homogeneous. A firm who decides
to commit to CSR supports a higher variable cost than a firm who does
not invest in social responsibility3. On the consumers’ side, we assume that
there are two types of consumers, socially concerned and traditional. Tradi-
tional consumers do not give any value to the fact that ethical firms operate
in the market. We solve the game backwards and we find that a large group
of socially concerned consumers or a low cost of CSR induces an equilib-
rium outcome in which one of the two firms chooses to be ethical while the
rival standard. Under these conditions, a symmetric Nash Equilibrium in
mixed strategies also exists and firms choose to be ethical (standard) with
positive and identical probabilities. Afterwards, we present a simple evo-
lutionary model where the market structure4 is composed by a single large
population of firms programmed to play either ethical or standard produc-
tion. Firms are pairwise randomly matched to play the first stage of the
two-stage duopoly game and payoffs are the equilibrium profits obtained by
firms in the second stage of the game. We look for an Evolutionary Sta-
ble Strategy (ESS) and we find that, when the group of socially concerned
consumers is large enough or cost of CSR is low, the unique ESS of the
model corresponds to the unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of
the two-stage game. This implies that equilibrium mixed strategies of the
two-stage game represents the evolutionary stable population state of our
model, where the probability to adopt ethical (standard) production rep-
resents the population share of ethical (standard) firms which operate in
the economy. Hence, at the ESS, ethical and standard firms coexists and
market cannot be entirely composed of either ethical or standard firms. The
same result is obtained in a dynamic framework (using the Replicator Dy-
namics): the unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the two-stage
3We assume a higher variable cost for the ethical firm since a positive commitment
to CSR represents the respect of an ethical code of conduct that the firm decides to
adopt in the production of goods: as an example, we may think to the adoption of an
environmentally friendly production system or to the respect of a minimum wage for
workers.
4We adapt to our context a market structure similar to that assumed in Qin and Stuart,
1997 and Hehenkamp and Leininger, 1999.
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game represents the unique globally stable population state. When cost of
CSR is high or socially concerned consumers group is of a small size, results
are different: at the ESS market is entirely composed of standard firms.
The next section introduces the two-stage game and its equilibria. In
Section 3 we present the evolutionary model and results. In Section 4 we
investigate the consequences of two kinds of policies that affect preferences
for CSR and cost of CSR. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Two-Stage Game
In this Section we describe the two-stage duopoly game played by firms.
2.1 Consumers’ Preferences
We assume that there are two types of consumers, socially concerned and
traditional. The share of socially concerned consumers is denoted by β ∈
[0, 1], while the share of traditional consumers is 1 − β. Both types of
consumers have the same taste parameter v > 0 and quasi-linear quadratic
preferences. The utility of socially concerned consumers (SCC) is:
u = (v + θ)q − q
2
2
+m, (1)
where q is the quantity, m is the numeraire and θ is the term which incre-
ments utility of SCC when at least one firm commits to CSR; hence, θ = 0 if
no firm commits to CSR and θ > 0 if at least one firm in the market invests
in social responsibility5. The utility of traditional consumers is given by:
u = vq − q
2
2
+m. (2)
Budget constraint of both types of consumers is
m+ qp ≤ y, (3)
5We adopt a framework similar to Immordino (2008); in Immordino (2008) consumers
are divided into two different groups: self-interested and inequity-averse consumers; both
types of consumers have the same taste parameter and quasi-linear quadratic preferences.
However, in Immordino (2008), inequity-averse consumers give a negative value to the
presence of different labor standards in the economy (this assumption is due to Fehr and
Schimdt, 1999). Indeed in our work we assume that socially concerned consumers give a
positive value to the presence of ethical firms in the market.
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where p is the price of product and y > 0 is the endowment of consumers. By
maximizing utility of each type of consumer subject to the budget constraint
we obtain their demand functions. Quantity demanded by SCC is q =
v + θ − p while the demand of traditional consumers is q = v − p. Hence,
market demand is given by:
q = β(v + θ − p) + (1− β)(v − p). (4)
Demand is increasing in the taste parameter v, decreasing in price and in-
creasing in θ and β. If no firm commits to CSR or no SCC are present in
the economy, term βθ is equal to zero. Since, in the economy, only two firms
operate in the market, q is the sum of the quantities produced by the two
firms, q = q1 + q2. The inverse demand function is:
p = v + βθ − (q1 + q2). (5)
2.2 Firms’ Choices
In the first stage of the game each firm i (with i = {1, 2}) can decide to
be either ethical (e) or standard (s); the set of pure strategies of firm i is
given by Si = {e, s}. The mixed-strategy set of each firm i is given by
∆ = {δ ∈ <2+ :
∑
si=e,s
δsi = δe + δs = 1} and hence δs = 1 − δe. A mixed
strategy profile is a vector
(
δ, δ
′
)
whose components δ = (δe, 1− δe) and
δ
′
=
(
δ
′
e, 1− δ
′
e
)
are respectively the mixed strategies played by firms 1 and
2.
For any si ∈ Si firm i’s cost function is Ci(si, qi) = csiqi where if si = e,
ce ∈ (0, v) and if si = s, cs = 0. In the second stage, firms observe the
choices made in the first stage and simultaneously decide quantities in order
to maximize profits. Products of the two firms are homogeneous. We solve
the game backwards, beginning with the second stage.
The second stage problem of each firm i is
max
qi
pii = [v + βθ − (qi + qj)]qi − csiqi, (6)
with i 6= j. To solve the second stage we have to analyze separately the
following three cases: i. both firms decide to be ethical (si, sj) = (e, e); ii.
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both firms decide to be standard (si, sj) = (s, s); iii. firm i decides to be
ethical and firm j standard (si, sj) = (e, s).
Case .i. If, at the first stage, both firms decide to be ethical, firms’ best
replies (with i 6= j) are
qi(qj) =
1
2
(v + βθ − qj − ce). (7)
Equilibrium quantities are
q∗i (e, e) = q
∗
j (e, e) =
1
3
(v + βθ − ce), (8)
and equilibrium profits are
pi∗i (e, e) = pi
∗
j (e, e) =
1
9
[ce − (v + βθ)]2. (9)
Case .ii. If, at the first stage, both firms decide to be standard and hence
θ = 0, firms’ best replies (with i 6= j) are
qi(qj) =
1
2
(v − qj). (10)
Equilibrium quantities are
q∗i (s, s) = q
∗
j (s, s) =
1
3
v, (11)
and equilibrium profits are
pi∗i (s, s) = pi
∗
j (s, s) =
1
9
v2. (12)
Case .iii. If, at the first stage, firm i decides to be ethical and j standard,
firms’ best replies (with i 6= j) are
qi(qj) =
1
2
(v + βθ − ce − qj), (13)
qj(qi) =
1
2
(v + βθ − qi). (14)
Equilibrium quantities are
q∗i (e, s) =
1
3
(v + βθ − 2ce), (15)
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q∗j (e, s) =
1
3
(v + βθ + ce), (16)
with
q∗i (e, s) < q
∗
j (e, s). (17)
Equilibrium profits are
pi∗i (e, s) =
1
9
[2ce − (βθ + v)]2, (18)
pi∗j (e, s) =
1
9
[ce + βθ + v]2, (19)
with
pi∗i (e, s) < pi
∗
j (e, s). (20)
We now solve the first stage of the game. At each strategy profile (s1, s2)
is associated a payoff profile (pi∗1 (s1, s2) , pi∗2 (s1, s2)), where pi∗i (s1, s2) is the
equilibrium profit of firm i of the second stage of the game. Matrix 2x2 of
figure 1 represents the first stage of the game.
Firm 2
e s
Firm 1
e pi∗1(e, e),pi∗2(e, e) pi∗1(e, s),pi∗2(e, s)
s pi∗1(s, e),pi∗2(s, e) pi∗1(s, s),pi∗2(s, s)
Figure 1: The First Stage.
Equilibria of the model depend on parameters c, v, θ and β. In particular
there are two6 different equilibrium configurations:
(1) Ethical and standard firms coexists in the market. The model admits
two asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (s∗1, s∗2) = (e, s),
(s∗1, s∗2) = (s, e), and one symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
with δ∗e = δ
′∗
e =
(2ce−βθ)(2ce−βθ−2v)
4c2e+βθ(βθ+2v)
∈ (0, 1).
(2) Market is entirely composed of standard firms. The model admits one
symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: (s∗1, s∗2) = (s, s).
6There also exists a third equilibrium configuration in which the model admits two
asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (e, s), (s
∗
1, s
∗
2) = (s, e) and
one symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (s, s). We do not take in
consideration this configuration since it is a special case of the model (see the Appendix).
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We summarize our findings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.1 When θ ≥ 2v, ethical and standard firms coexists in the
market if and only if β ∈ [2vθ , 1] for any ce ∈ (0, v); if instead β ∈ (0, 2vθ ),
coexistence is obtained if and only if ce ∈
(
0, βθ2
)
where βθ2 < v. When
θ < 2v, ethical and standard firms coexists in the market if and only if
ce ∈
(
0, βθ2
)
. Otherwise, market is entirely composed of standard firms.
Proof See the Appendix.
When β = 0 (all the consumers are traditional), our model is a standard
Cournot duopoly game where firms have different marginal costs; at equilib-
rium, each firm chooses standard production (ce = 0) since it is the dominant
strategy. When β > 0, ethical production can be convenient for one of the
two firms but not for both. Indeed, when firm i chooses to be ethical, stan-
dard production is the dominant strategy for firm j, whatever is ce and β. If
instead firm i chooses to be standard, ethical production can be convenient
for firm j. Proposition 2.1 indicates that, in this case, there exists a sub-
stitution effect between ce and β as incentives for firm j to choose ethical
production. In particular, when SCC attach weak importance to the pres-
ence of ethical firms in the market (i.e. θ < 2v), firm j chooses to be ethical
only if cost ce is relatively low
(
ce ∈
(
0, βθ2
))
and β does not play any role
in this choice. If instead SCC attach great importance to the presence of
ethical firms in the market (i.e. θ ≥ 2v), a large group of SCC (β ∈ [2vθ , 1])
becomes the dominant incentive for firm j to commit to CSR: if firm j
chooses ethical production, a relatively high β increases so much market
demand (through term θβ) that cost of CSR becomes irrelevant in firm j’s
choice. The opposite holds with a relatively low value of β
(
β ∈ (0, 2vθ )).
3 The evolutionary model
A central question of this paper is to study under what conditions coexis-
tence between ethical and standard firms is an equilibrium outcome robust
to evolutionary pressures. In order to investigate this issue, in this Section,
we present a simple evolutionary model in which the economy is composed
3.1 A static analysis 9
by a single large population of firms where a share δe ∈ [0, 1] is ethical and a
share δs = 1−δe is standard. Then we analyze whether coexistence between
ethical and standard firms – i.e. 0 < δe < 1 – is a stable population state
both in a static and a dynamic analysis.
3.1 A static analysis
Let us assume that our economy is constituted by a single large (infinite)
population of firms programmed to play either ethical or standard produc-
tion (e or s). The proportions of ethical and standard firms are respectively
δe ∈ [0, 1] and δs = 1 − δe, with δ = (δe, δs) ∈ ∆. Let us also assume that
firms are pairwise randomly matched to play the first stage of the two-stage
game of Section 2, where payoffs are the equilibrium profits obtained by
firms in the second stage of the game. Figure 1 represents the four possible
matches and the associated payoffs. Let us now assume that the population
of firms in our economy is originally in state δ ∈ ∆ (as an example we may
think of a situation in which δ is the population state led by evolution). The
profit earned by a firm drawn at random from the population state δ when
also its rival is drawn at random from δ is given by:
Π (δ, δ) =
[
δe 1− δe
] [ pi∗(e, e) pi∗(e, s)
pi∗(s, e) pi∗(s, s)
] [
δe
1− δe
]
(21)
= Aδ2e +Bδe + C. (22)
where
A = [pi∗(e, e)− pi∗(s, e)− pi∗(e, s) + pi∗(s, s)] , (23)
B = [pi∗(s, e) + pi∗(e, s)− 2pi∗(s, s)] , (24)
and
C = pi∗(s, s). (25)
Π
(
δ
′
, δ
)
is the profit earned by a firm drawn at random from an alternative
population state δ
′ ∈ ∆ when its rival is drawn at random from population
state δ ∈ ∆, Π
(
δ, δ
′
)
is the profit earned by a firm drawn at random from
δ ∈ ∆ when its rival is drawn at random from an alternative population
state δ
′ ∈ ∆ and Π
(
δ
′
, δ
′
)
is the profit earned by a firm drawn at random
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from δ
′ ∈ ∆ when also its rival is drawn at random from δ′ . We define as
evolutionary stable a population state which satisfies the following definition.
Definition A strategy (population state) δ ∈ ∆ is defined as an evolution-
ary stable strategy (ESS) if for every δ
′ 6= δ it is:
(a) Π (δ, δ) > Π
(
δ
′
, δ
)
; or
(b) Π (δ, δ) = Π
(
δ
′
, δ
)
and Π
(
δ, δ
′
)
> Π
(
δ
′
, δ
′
)
.
In other words, a population state δ is evolutionary stable if, for each alter-
native population state, there exists a positive invasion barrier such that,
if the population share of firms of the alternative population state falls be-
low this barrier, then firms of population state δ earns a higher payoff than
that of the alternative population state (see Weibull J. W., 1995). In our
model, an equilibrium configuration is represented by an evolutionary stable
population state (ESS). The following proposition indicates the ESS of the
model.
Proposition 3.1 When β ∈ [2vθ , 1] or ce ∈ (0, βθ2 ), there exist an ESS in
which ethical and standard firms coexists in the market. Otherwise, there
exists an ESS in which market is entirely composed of standard firms.
Proof See the Appendix.
When the group of SCC is large enough
(
β ∈ [2vθ , 1]) or the cost of CSR is
low
(
ce ∈
(
0, βθ2
))
, a market entirely composed of either ethical or standard
firms is not evolutionary stable. The ESS corresponds to the unique sym-
metric mixed strategies Nash equilibrium7 δ∗e = δ
′∗
e =
(2ce−βθ)(2ce−βθ−2v)
4c2e+βθ(βθ+2v)
∈
(0, 1); this implies that population shares of ethical and standard firms, δ∗e
and δ∗s , are strictly positive: ethical and standard firms coexists into our
economy and earn Π (δ∗, δ∗) (see equation (21) where δe = δ∗e). Otherwise,
7When the group of SCC is large enough or the cost of CSR is low, our evolutionary
model corresponds to a Hawk-Dove game; a well-known result in the evolutionary litera-
ture is that, in a Hack-Dove game, the ESS corresponds to the unique symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium of the game: pure hawkishness or pure doveness are not evolutionary
stable strategies (see Weibull J. W., 1995; Vega-Redondo F., 2003).
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the ESS corresponds to the unique symmetric pure strategies Nash equilib-
rium δ∗e = δ
′∗
e = 0; the evolutionary stable population share of ethical firms
is equal to zero and population is entirely composed of standard firms which
earn pi∗(s, s). This is also the case when all the consumers are traditional,
i.e. when β = 0.
3.2 A dynamic analysis
Let us analyze the evolutionary model presented in the previous section
adopting a dynamic approach. We undertake the most basic dynamic model
used in the evolutionary literature, the Replicator Dynamics (hereafter RD).
Time is measured continuously and, in every time period t ≥ 0, firms
from a single large (infinite) population are pairwise randomly selected
to play the first stage of the two-stage game of Section 2. Each firm is
programmed to play a pure strategy (e or s) and, at each time period t,
δt = (δe,t, 1− δe,t) ∈ ∆ represents respectively the proportions of ethical
(δe,t) and standard (1 − δe,t) firms in the population respectively (i.e. the
population state). Population state δt ∈ ∆ is formally identical to a mixed
strategy. The expected profit using pure strategy si = e or s, at a random
match t, when the population is in state δt ∈ ∆, is Πt (si, δt), while the
average expected profit in the population at any random match t (i.e. the
profit earned by a firm drawn at random from the population) is Πt (δt, δt).
Supposing that the net reproduction rate of each firm (i.e. each strategy
si) is proportional to its score Πt (si, δt), with the RD we have the following
continuous-time dynamic system for δs,t:
δ˙si,t = δsi,t[Πt (si, δt)−Πt (δt, δt)] (26)
where δ˙t is the derivative of δt with respect of t. A well-known result in the
evolutionary literature which correlates the RD with the notion of ESS (due
to Hofbauer et al., 1979) is that any population state corresponding to an
ESS is asymptotically stable in terms of the RD with a single population of
players8. Hence, it follows that
8This result is no more satisfied in case of multiple populations of players (see Fudenberg
D. and Levine D. K., 1998).
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Proposition 3.2 When β ∈ [2vθ , 1] or ce ∈ (0, βθ2 ), there exist a globally
stable population state in which ethical and standard firms coexists in the
market. Otherwise, there exists a asymptotically stable population state in
which market is entirely composed of standard firms.
Proof See Proposition (3.1) and Hofbauer et al. (1979).
4 Policy Implications
In the Green Paper (2001), CSR is defined as an instrument which can
promote “a positive contribution to the strategic goal decided in Lisbon:
to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better
jobs and greater social cohesion” (see the Green Paper, 2001, p. 6). The
expansion of CSR is thus considered crucial for the EU institution. In this
Section we investigate how a policy maker can expand CSR. We concentrate
our analysis on two kinds of policies that affect preferences – through β – and
cost of CSR – through ce.9 A policy based on schooling and education may
increment the number of socially concerned consumers (β) in the economy,
and a policy maker can promote CSR providing subsidies to ethical firms in
order to reduce their social costs ce.
Let us assume that the economy is at ESS, δ∗e =
(2ce−βθ)(2ce−βθ−2v)
4c2e+βθ(βθ+2v)
∈
(0, 1). A policy which reduces social costs of ethical firms (ce) always causes
an expansion of ethical firms in the economy (δ∗e) and a reduction of standard
firms (δ∗s):
σδ∗e
σce
< 0 and σδ
∗
s
σce
> 0 (see the Appendix). Moreover, as ce goes to
0, the economy tends to be entirely composed of ethical firms δ∗e → 1. An
interesting result is also obtained when ce tends to its upper value. When
cost of CSR is low
(
ce ∈
(
0, βθ2
))
and ce tends to its upper value
(
βθ
2
)
, the
economy tends to be entirely composed of standard firms δ∗e → 0; this does
not happen when SCC’ group is large
(
β ∈ [2vθ , 1]). In this case, as ce tends
to its upper value (v), the proportion of ethical firms does not tend to zero
but to a positive fixed value. Hence, when a policy maker does not reduce
social cost of ethical firms and the cost tends to its upper value, a large
9There are other parameters which may be included in our analysis; however, given
our framework β and ce generate more interesting results.
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group of SCC is essential to have a market in which ethical firms operate.
These results are summarized in figures 2 and 3.
ce → 0 ce → βθ2
δ∗e 1 0
δ∗s 0 1
Figure 2: The ESS when cost of CSR is low.
ce → 0 ce → v
δ∗e 1
(βθ−2v)βθ
4v2+βθ(βθ+2v)
> 0
δ∗s 0
(βθ+v)4v
4v2+βθ(βθ+2v)
> 0
Figure 3: The ESS when the SSC’ group is large.
A policy on β has a similar impact on δ∗e and δ∗s . In particular, a pol-
icy which increments the number of socially concerned consumers β always
causes an expansion of ethical firms in the economy (δ∗e) and a reduction of
standard firms (δ∗s):
σδ∗e
σβ < 0 and
σδ∗s
σβ > 0 (see the Appendix). However,
differently from a policy on ce, a policy on β cannot induce the economy
to be entirely composed of ethical firms: as β tends to its upper value (1),
the share of ethical firms tends to a positive fixed value which is negatively
correlated to c (as ce goes to 0, the value of δ∗e tends to 1). When β tends
to 0, the economy tends to be entirely composed of standard firms (δ∗e tends
to a negative value) and, finally, as β tends to 2vθ , the share of ethical firms
tends to a positive fixed value.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper proposes a partial equilibrium model in which socially concerned
consumers’ preferences affect firms’ decisions to commit to CSR. We made a
crucial assumption: a share of consumers is socially concerned in the sense
that they desire to have a market in which ethical firms operate. Under this
assumption, we found that a large group of socially concerned consumers
or a low cost of CSR induces an equilibrium outcome in which ethical and
standard firms coexist in the market. This result is relevant because we
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do not assume a product differentiation set-up and firms are not able to
separate the market through ethical labeling. Moreover, a strictly positive
share of socially concerned consumers is essential to obtain these results:
when all the consumers are traditional our model is a standard Cournot
game in which no firm decides to commit to CSR.
We also analyzes two kinds of policies: a policy which increments the
number of socially concerned consumers in the economy (β) and a policy
which reduces social costs of ethical firms (ce). We found that any policy
which either increments the share of socially concerned consumers or reduces
social cost always induces an expansion (reduction) of ethical (standard)
firms in the economy. However only a policy which reduces social cost ce is
able to induce the economy to be entirely composed of ethical firms. Our
policy analysis suffer from the partial equilibrium set-up adopted; indeed an
extension of our analysis to a general equilibrium set-up could give a better
understanding of our results in terms of policies and their implications on
welfare.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
Let us suppose that firm j chooses to be ethical. From equations (9) and (19), firm i
always chooses to be standard since inequality
pi∗i (s, e) =
1
9
[ce + βθ + v]
2 >
1
9
[ce − (v + βθ)]2 = pi∗i (e, e) (27)
is always satisfied.
Let us suppose that firm j chooses to be standard. From equations (12) and (18), firm i
chooses to be ethical if and only if
pi∗i (e, s) =
1
9
[2ce − (βθ + v)]2 > 1
9
v2 = pi∗i (s, s). (28)
Inequality (28) can be rewritten as
4c2e − 4ce(βθ + v) + β2θ2 + 2βθv > 0 (29)
The right-hand side of inequality (29) is a second-order polynomial which is represented
by a convex parabola whose roots are
ce1 =
βθ
2
(30)
and
ce2 =
βθ + 2v
2
, (31)
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with ∆ = 16v2 > 0 (for any value of v) and ce2 > ce1 > 0 for β > 0. If β = 0, ce1 = 0,
ce2 = v, and inequality (28) is never satisfied: firm i chooses to be standard for any value
of ce ∈ (0, v). If β > 0, inequality (28) is satisfied if and only if ce ∈
(
0,min
(
βθ
2
, v
))
(firm
i chooses to be ethical); if instead ce ∈
(
min
(
βθ
2
, v
)
, v
)
, inequality (28) is not satisfied and
firm i chooses to be standard. Finally, if ce = min
(
βθ
2
, v
)
with ce 6= v, firm i is indifferent
between e and s. This implies the following.
(i) When θ < 2v, v > ce1 for any value of β ∈ (0, 1] and
(a) if ce ∈ (0, ce1), firm i chooses to be ethical;
(b) if ce = ce1, firm i is indifferent between ethical and standard production; and
(c) if ce ∈ (ce1, v), firm i chooses to be standard.
(ii) When θ ≥ 2v and β ∈ [ 2v
θ
, 1
]
, firm i chooses to be ethical.
(iii) When θ ≥ 2v and β ∈ (0, 2v
θ
)
, cases (a), (b) and (c) holds.
To summarize there are three equilibrium configurations.
(1) If β > 0 and case i.a holds or case ii holds or case iii.a holds, the model admits two
asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (e, s) and (s
∗
1, s
∗
2) = (s, e).
(2) If β = 0 or β > 0 and case i.c holds or β > 0 and case iii.c holds, the model admits
one symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies: (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (s, s).
(3) If β > 0 and case i.b holds or case iii.b holds, the model admits one symmetric Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (s, s) and two asymmetric Nash equilibria in
pure strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (e, s) and (s
∗
1, s
∗
2) = (s, e).
Let us now analyze the case in which firms 1 and 2 respectively play mixed strategies δ
and δ
′
with δ, δ
′ ∈ ∆. From
Epi1(s1 = e) = Epi1(s1 = s) (32)
and
Epi2(s2 = e) = Epi2(s2 = s), (33)
where Epii(si) is the expected profit of firm i when firm i plays pure strategy si and firm
j mixed strategy δ ∈ ∆, it holds that
δe = δ
′
e ≡ pi
∗(e, s)− pi∗(s, s)
[pi∗(e, s)− pi∗(s, s)] + [pi∗(s, e)− pi∗(e, e)] =
(2ce − βθ)(2ce − βθ − 2v)
4c2e + βθ(βθ + 2v)
. (34)
Equality (34) is an equilibrium mixed strategy if and only if δe = δ
′
e ∈ (0, 1). This holds
only in case (1). In case (2) δe = δ
′
e < 0, while, in case (3) it is δe = δ
′
e > 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
From conditions i. and ii. of definition (3.1), it follows that an ESS must be a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium. Thus, the candidates to be an ESS are the symmetric Nash
equilibria of the game: (s1, s2) = (s, s) (which implies δ
∗
e = δ
′∗
e = 0) and (δ
∗, δ∗) with
δ∗e = δ
′∗
e =
(2ce−βθ)(2ce−βθ−2v)
4c2e+βθ(βθ+2v)
∈ (0, 1).
Let us verify if these two equilibria are evolutionary stable strategies. Let us start with
(δ∗, δ∗). Since (δ∗, δ∗) is a mixed strategies equilibrium, it holds that
Π (δ∗, δ∗) = Π
(
δ
′
, δ∗
)
(35)
This implies that (δ∗, δ∗) to be an ESS must verify
Π
(
δ∗, δ′
)
> Π
(
δ
′
, δ′
)
for all δ
′ 6= δ. (36)
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Π (δ∗, δ′)−Π
(
δ
′
, δ′
)
is given by
Π
(
δ∗, δ′
)−Π(δ′ , δ′) = a2δ′2e − 2abδ′2e + b2
a
=
δ
′
e(a− b)2
a
, (37)
where
a = [pi∗(s, e)− pi∗(e, e)] + [pi∗(e, s)− pi∗(s, s)] (38)
and
b = [pi∗(e, s)− pi∗(s, s)]. (39)
Since δ
′
e ∈ (0, 1) and a > 0 (from case 1 – Proof of Proposition 2.1 – it holds that
pi∗(s, e) > pi∗(e, e) and pi∗(e, s) > pi∗(s, s)), equality (36) is satisfied and (δ∗, δ∗) is an ESS.
Let us now verify if (s1, s2) = (s, s) is an ESS. (s, s) is an equilibrium in cases 2 and 3 (see
Proof of Proposition 2.1). Let us assume that we are in case 2 (see Proof of Proposition
2.1). Π (δ∗, δ∗)−Π
(
δ
′
, δ∗
)
is given by
Π (δ∗, δ∗)−Π
(
δ
′
, δ∗
)
= pi∗(s, s)− [δ′epi∗(e, s) + (1− δ
′
e)pi
∗(s, s)] = bδ
′
e, (40)
with δ
′
e ∈ (0, 1) and b < 0 (from case 2 – Proof of Proposition 2.1 – it holds that pi∗(e, s) <
pi∗(s, s)). Hence condition i. of definition (3.1) is satisfied and (s1, s2) = (s, s) is an
ESS. Finally, let us assume that we are in case 3 (see Proof of Proposition 2.1). In
this case, it is Π (δ∗, δ∗) = Π
(
δ
′
, δ∗
)
(condition i. of definition 3.1 is not satisfied) and
Π
(
δ∗, δ
′)−Π(δ′ , δ′) is given by
Π
(
δ∗, δ
′)−Π(δ′ , δ′) = δ′2e [pi∗(s, e)− pi∗(e, e)] , (41)
where pi∗(s, e) > pi∗(e, e) and δ
′
e ∈ (0, 1). Hence condition ii. of definition (3.1) is satisfied
and (s1, s2) = (s, s) is an ESS also in case 3.
A.2 Policy Implications
Policy on social cost
Let assume that economy is at ESS, δ∗e =
(2ce−βθ)(2ce−βθ−2v)
4c2e+βθ(βθ+2v)
∈ (0, 1) (case 1, Proof of
Proposition 2.1). Derivative of δ∗e with respect to ce is:
σδ∗e
σce
=
16(v + βθ)c2e − 8βθv2 − 4β3θ3 − 12β2θ2v
(4c2e + β2θ2 + 2βθv)
2 . (42)
Since the denominator
(
4c2e + β
2θ2 + 2βθv
)2
is strictly greater than zero, the sign of
σδ∗e
σce
depends on the sign of the numerator 16(v + βθ)c2e − 8βθv2 − 4β3θ3 − 12β2θ2v, which is
a second-order polynomial (represented by a convex parabola) whose roots are
c = −
√
2βθv + β2θ2
2
< 0 (43)
and
c =
√
2βθv + β2θ2
2
> 0. (44)
If c ≥ v, it is σδ∗e
σce
< 0 for any ce ∈ (0, v); if instead c < v, σδ
∗
e
σce
< 0 if ce ∈ (0, c) and
σδ∗e
σce
≥ 0 if ce ∈ [c, v). This implies the following:
(i) If β ≥ (
√
20−2)v
2θ
, it is
σδ∗e
σce
< 0;
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(ii) If β <
(
√
20−2)v
2θ
and ce ∈ (0, c], it is σδ
∗
e
σce
≤ 0;
(iii) If β <
(
√
20−2)v
2θ
and ce ∈ (c, v), it is σδ
∗
e
σce
> 0.
Since
(
√
20−2)v
2θ
> 2v
θ
and c > βθ
2
, it is
σδ∗e
σce
> 0 for any value of ce and β that satisfies case
(1) of Proof of Proposition 2.1, i.e. for any value of ce and β such that the economy is at
the ESS δ∗e =
(2ce−βθ)(2ce−βθ−2v)
4c2e+βθ(βθ+2v)
∈ (0, 1). Moreover, since δ∗s = 1 − δ∗e , it is σδ
∗
s
σce
< 0 for
any value of ce and β such that the economy is at the ESS δ
∗
e =
(2ce−βθ)(2ce−βθ−2v)
4c2e+βθ(βθ+2v)
∈ (0, 1).
Policy on preferences
Let assume that economy is at ESS, δ∗e =
(2ce−βθ)(2ce−βθ−2v)
4c2e+βθ(βθ+2v)
∈ (0, 1) (case 1, Proof of
Proposition 2.1). Derivative of δ∗e with respect to β is:
σδ∗e
σβ
=
4θce
(−4c2e + β2θ2 + 2βθv + 2v2)
(4c2e + β2θ2 + 2βθv)
2 . (45)
Since the denominator
(
4c2e + β
2θ2 + 2βθv
)2
is strictly greater than zero, the sign of
σδ∗e
σβ
depends on the sign of the numerator 4θce
(−4c2e + β2θ2 + 2βθv + 2v2), which is a second-
order polynomial (represented by a convex parabola) whose roots are
β1 = −v +
√
4c2e − v2
θ
< 0 (46)
and
β2 =
−v +√4c2e − v2
θ
, (47)
with ∆ = 4c2e − v2. When ce ∈
(
0, v
2
]
, ∆ ≤ 0; this implies that the numerator of equality
(45) is strictly greater than zero for any β ∈ (0, 1) and σδ∗e
σβ
> 0. Let us study the case
in which ce ∈
(
v
2
, v
)
and ∆ > 0. In this case, it results that β2 ≤ 0 if ce ∈
(
v
2
, v√
2
]
and
β2 > 0 if ce ∈
(
v√
2
, v
)
. Hence, when ce ∈
(
0, v√
2
]
, the numerator of equality (45) is
strictly greater than zero for any β ∈ (0, 1) and σδ∗e
σβ
> 0. When ce ∈
(
v√
2
, v
)
, β2 < 1 if
and only if
4c2e − 2v2 − 2θv − θ2 < 0. (48)
The left-hand side of inequality (48) is a second-order polynomial represented by a convex
parabola whose roots are
c
′
e = −
√
2v2 + θ2 + 2θv
2
< 0 (49)
and
c
′′
e =
√
2v2 + θ2 + 2θv
2
> 0. (50)
If c
′′
e > v, then β2 < 1 for any ce ∈ (0, v). If instead c
′′
e ≤ v, then β2 < 1 if ce < c
′′
e and
β2 ≥ 1 if ce ≥ c′′e . In particular, c
′′
e > v is satisfied if and only if
θ2 + 2θv − 2v2 > 0. (51)
The left-hand side of inequality (51) is a second-order polynomial represented by a convex
parabola whose roots are
θ1 = −v(
√
3 + 1) < 0 (52)
and
θ2 = v(
√
3 + 1) > 0, (53)
with ∆ = 12v2 > 0. Hence
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• if θ ≤ θ2, θ2 + 2θv − 2v2 ≤ 0 and c′′e ≤ v;
• if θ > θ2, θ2 + 2θv − 2v2 > 0, c′′e > v and β2 < 1 for any ce ∈ (0, v).
In summary, it follows that
(a)
σδ∗e
σβ
> 0 if ce ∈
(
0, v√
2
]
or θ ≤ θ2, ce ∈
(
v√
2
, c
′′
e
)
and β ∈ (β2, 1] or θ > θ2 and
β ∈ (β2, 1];
(b)
σδ∗e
σβ
= 0 if θ ≤ θ2, ce ∈
(
v√
2
, c
′′
e
)
and β = β2 or θ > θ2 and β = β2;
(c)
σδ∗e
σβ
< 0 if θ ≤ θ2, ce ∈
(
v√
2
, c
′′
e
)
and β ∈ (0, β2) or θ ≤ θ2 and ce ∈
[
c
′′
e , v
)
or θ > θ2
and β ∈ (0, β2).
Let us verify that in case 1 of Proof of Proposition 2.1, case (a) is always satisfied. Let us
assume that θ ≥ 2v and β ∈ [ 2v
θ
, 1
]
. In this case, it is θ > θ2 and β2 <
2v
θ
; this implies
that
[
2v
θ
, 1
]
is a subset of (β2, 1] and hence
σδ∗e
σβ
> 0 (see case (a)).
Let us assume that θ ≥ 2v, β ∈ [0, 2v
θ
)
and ce ∈ (0, ce1). In this case, it is θ > θ2 and
β2 <
2v
θ
. If β ∈ (β2, 2vθ ], it is σδ∗eσβ > 0; if instead β ∈ (0, β2), then we have to check for ce.
In particular, it results that ce1 <
v√
2
and (0, ce1) is a subset of
(
0, v√
2
]
if β < 2v
θ
√
2
< 2v
θ
and 2v
θ
√
2
> β2. Hence, for β ∈ (0, β2), β < 2vθ√2 and
σδ∗e
σβ
> 0 (see case (a)).
Let us assume that θ < 2v and ce ∈ (0, ce1). It results that ce1 < v√2 if θ < 2vβ√2 and
2v
β
√
2
≥ 2v if β ≤ 1√
2
. Hence, if β ≤ 1√
2
, θ < 2v implies that (0, ce1) is a subset of
(
0, v√
2
]
and
σδ∗e
σβ
> 0. If instead β ∈
(
1√
2
, 2v
)
, it is 2v
β
√
2
< 2v and ce1 >
v√
2
for θ ∈
(
2v
β
√
2
, 2v
)
.
Since 2v
β
√
2
> θ2, θ ∈
(
2v
β
√
2
, 2v
)
implies θ > θ2. Moreover, since β2 <
1√
2
, β > 1√
2
implies
β ∈ (β2, 1] and case (a) holds: σδ
∗
e
σβ
> 0.
We can conclude that, for any value of ce and β such that the economy is at the ESS
δ∗e =
(2ce−βθ)(2ce−βθ−2v)
4c2e+βθ(βθ+2v)
∈ (0, 1), it is σδ∗e
σβ
> 0 and
σδ∗s
σβ
< 0 because δ∗e = 1− δ∗s .
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